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Abstract
In this article we outline a theory of action verbs that combines a modality-independent
(or abstract) conceptual component with a modality-speciVc one. Verbs as concepts
are interpreted as ranked sets of nuclei structures in the sense of Moens and Steedman
(1988). This information is stored in the middle temporal gyrus (Bedny and Caramazza
2011). Besides being amodal, this information is underspeciVed w.r.t. a particular way in
which the action is executed (grasp a needle vs. grasp a barbell), i. e. it is not grounded in
a particular situation. This underspeciVcation can in general only be resolved if the type
of object undergoing the change (needle vs. barbell) is known. Following Willems et al.
(2009), this grounding is explained as an implicit simulation in premotor cortex, that is
a preenactment of the action which makes it possible to predict the way in which the
action evolves and which is distinct from explicit (motor) imagery.
1 Theories of grounded cognition: evidence and problems1
According to Zwaan and Kaschak (2008: 368), ‘language is a sequence of stimuli that
orchestrate the retrieval of experiential traces of people, places, objects, events, and
actions.’ They illustrate this view of language with an example taken from Barsalou
(1999). When reading the sentence John removed an apple pie from the oven, a compre-
hender understands this sentence by retrieving past experiences involving persistent
objects like apple pies and ovens as well as events of removing something, for instance,
an apple pie from an oven. These traces usually include both motor experiences such as
lifting the pie and feeling its weight and perceptual experience like seeing and smelling
the pie and feeling the heat coming out of the oven. Similarly, when processing the
verb throw or the sentence Bill throws the ball, a speaker mentally simulates an action of
throwing (Pulvermüller 2005). On this view, ‘the understanding of action-related sen-
tences implies an internal simulation of the action expressed in the sentences, mediated
1 The research was supported by the German Science Foundation (DFG) funding the Collaborative Research
Center 991.
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by the activation of the same motor representations that are involved in their execution’
(Buccino et al. 2005: 361). On this view, understanding words and other linguistic items
is based on the same neural substrate as imagining the actions and objects described by
those linguistic expressions (Gallese and LakoU 2005: 456). For example, Gallese and
LakoU argue that one can understand the sentence Harry picked up the glass only if one
can imagine picking up a glass or seeing someone picking up a glass. This view is in
line with the idea of Hebbian learning: neuronal correlation is mapped onto connection
strength. As formulated by Hauk et al. (2004: 301): ‘If word forms frequently co-occur
with visual perceptions (object words), their meaning-related activity may be found in
temporal visual areas, whereas action words frequently encountered in the context of
body movements may produce meaning-related activation in the frontocentral motor
areas’. If a verb refers to actions and events that are typically performed with the face,
arm or leg, neurons processing the word and those processing the action described by
that word frequently Vre together and thus become more strongly linked. As a result,
word-related networks overlap with motor and premotor cortex in a somatotopic fash-
ion (Pulvermüller 1999). On this semantic somatotopy view of meaning, being able to
simulate executing an action of the type denoted by the verb is constitutive of the verb’s
meaning.
Empirical evidence for theories of grounded (or embodied) cognition comes from
neuroimaging studies using FMRI or ERP. When action words are processed, there is
eUector-speciVc activation of motor areas that is somatotopically organized. For exam-
ple, a leg-related word like kick activates dorsal areas, where leg actions are represented
and processed, whereas arm-related words such as pick or face-related words such as
lick activate lateral or inferior frontal motor areas, respectively. Similarly, when read-
ing or viewing the noun hammer, the hand and not the foot area of the motor system
is activated.
Such theories of embodied cognition make a number of empirically testable predic-
tions: (i) understanding an action verb and imagining performing that same action rely
on the same neural tissue, in particular premotor cortex (Willems et al. 2009: 2388),
(ii) understanding action verbs is primarily based on early, modality-speciVc, sensory-
motor brain regions (Bedny and Caramazza 2011: 82) and (iii) these sensory-motor brain
regions are automatically engaged during word comprehension (Bedny and Caramazza
2011: 82).
The Vrst problem for theories of grounded cognition is that many neuroimaging
studies failed to observe any increased activity for action-verbs anywhere in the motor
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system (Bedny and Caramazza 2011: 87). A notable exception is the study by Willems et
al. (2009). In an fMRI study they examined whether implicit stimulations of actions dur-
ing language understanding involve the same cortical motor regions as explicit motor
imagery. The participants were presented with verbs that are either related to actions
that are usually executed with the hand, like throw, or with verbs that are not related
to this body part, like kneel. In order to control for spurious activation due to explicit
imagery, there were two diUerent tasks: participants either read the verbs (lexical de-
cision task LD) or they actively imagined performing the actions denoted by these verbs
(imagery task IM). Contrary to earlier results, they found a double dissociation. Primary
motor cortex showed eUector-speciVc activation during imagery, but not during the lex-
ical decision task. For the premotor area they found out that there was eUector-speciVc
activation that distinguished between manual and non-manual verbs, both in LD and
in IM. But importantly, there was no overlap or correlation between regions activated
during the two tasks. More precisely, portions of BA6 and BA4 that were deVned on
the basis of eUector-speciVc activity during the IM task showed no such activity during
LD. Similarly, regions in BA4 and BA6 that showed eUector-speciVc activity during LD
showed no such activity during IM. The authors conclude: “These double dissociations
show that implicit motor simulation and explicit motor imagery do not necessarily en-
gage the same neural tissues in premotor and primary motor cortices and by inference
may not include the same cognitive processes” (Willems et al. 2009: 2396).
Similar to the Willems et al. study, Postle et al. (2008) found eUector-speciVc ac-
tivity in premotor cortex only when participants viewed actions performed with hand,
arm or foot. By contrast, when they silently read the corresponding verbs, there was
only activation in premotor cortices. Importantly, premotor leg, arm and hand areas
responded to all action-verbs in the same way, i. e. there was no somatotopical reac-
tion. In addition, several of these premotor areas also responded to nouns and even
non-words. These results constitute strong evidence against prediction (i) i. e. that un-
derstanding action verbs and imagining performing those actions rely on the same, or
at least overlapping, neural tissues. Summarizing, one gets the following correlations:
• Primary motor cortex is active during motor imagery; during processing of action
verbs this cortex is not active, provided no corresponding instructions are given.
• Premotor cortex areas are active during comprehension of action verbs; however,
there is no overlap with areas in this cortex that are active during explicit imagery.
In addition, there need be no eUector-speciVc activity.
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According to Bedny and Caramazza (2011: 87), results like the above raise the im-
portant question of whether such activity in left premotor areas is speciVc to action
verb comprehension or whether this activity rather reWects a more general contribu-
tion of premotor cortex to language. Evidence for such a more general contribution
comes from several studies. Graziano (2006) showed that activity in premotor areas is
more sensitive to the behavioral context and possible goals and results brought about
by an action.2 Schluter et al. (1998) found that premotor cortex is involved in higher-
order aspects of movement like sequencing and movement selection. Similarly, this
cortex is involved in planning and predicting actions and sequentially structured events
(Schubotz and von Cramon 2004). When taken together, one gets that the premotor
cortex shares features with adjacent prefrontal cortex (Miller and Cohen 2001).
Evidence against prediction (ii) comes from studies involving the middle temporal
gyrus (MTG).3 There is more activity in MTG when participants generate action verbs
than when they generate color names for visually presented nouns. MTG is more active
when action verbs are processed compared to the processing of nouns for concrete
objects and color adjectives. Furthermore, MTG response is equally high with action
verbs like run and mental state verbs like think and it is equally low for nouns denoting
animals like tigers which are rich in motion features and nouns like rock which are low
in motion features. In addition, MTG responds more to verbs like give compared to
verbs like run. This area responds to action verbs in the absence of a sentence context.
Representations are neither visual nor motion related and regions in MTG that are
activated during processing of action verbs do not overlap with visual-motion regions.
Bedny and Caramazza (2011: 91) conclude that “these results argue that the MTG stores
modality-independent representations that encode conceptual rather than perceptual
properties. . . . Together, these results suggest that the MTG represents conceptual
information about events or meaning-relevant grammatical information about verbs.”
A key question with respect to prediction (iii) is: Do eUector-speciVc activations
show that they are used by speakers to semantically analyze the word or the words
in a sentence? As Vrst noted in Postle et al. (2008), this need not be the case. The
motor activation can be an epiphenomenon of processing the word or the constituents
in the sentence. The speaker semantically analyzes the expressions and simultaneously
or subsequently (s)he mentally imagines executing a corresponding action or event. As
2 This example as well as the following ones are taken from Bedny and Caramazza (2011).
3 For details on the following, see the discussion in Bedny and Caramazza (2011) as well as the references
cited therein.
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noted by Bedny and Caramazza (2011: 83), language-perception interactions need not
result because action-verb meanings are represented but rather because verb meaning
representations prime visual motion representations during contemporaneous linguis-
tic and perceptual tasks.4
2 Action, events and the dynamic structure of action verbs
When viewed from a linguistic, in particular semantic, viewpoint, a general weakness
of most studies involving action verbs consists in the restriction to test isolated verb
forms, in general inVnitive forms like kick or throw.5 However, what type of action or
event is denoted by an expression, say a sentence, in which an action verb occurs, not
only depends on the verb but also on its arguments and their semantic (or referential)
properties. Consider, for instance, the German examples in (1).
(1) a. Hans lief (stundenlang im Park herum).
b. Hans lief zum Bahnhof.
c. Hans lief durch den Park.
d. Hans lief zu Hochform auf.
Example (1a) is an activity expression admitting of modiVcation with a for- but not
with an in-adverbial. It describes an action as unbounded in the sense that no particular
goal (say a destination to be reached) is speciVed.6 By contrast, example (1b) describes a
running that has an explicit goal: the station. The action is therefore bounded by this
destination. Linguistically, this is reWected by the admissibility of modiVcation with
in-adverbials but not of that with for-adverbials. Example (1c) can be taken to either
describe an unbounded or a bounded event. In the Vrst case it corresponds to (1a) (Hans
ran across the park), whereas in the second case it corresponds to the English translation
Hans crossed the park. The last example diUers from the preceding ones. Here laufen
4 As noted by Willems et al. (2009: 2398), another reason why there is eUector-speciVc activity in motor
areas can be due to the fact that participants in those studies were not prevented from forming mental
images. Furthermore, Postle et al. (2008) note that the positive results can be artifacts of diUerences in
imageability between critical and control stimuli. For example, in the Hauk et al. (2004) study, action verbs
were compared to hash-marks as lower-level control. As a result, eUector-speciVc activity could have been
triggered by increased imagery to concrete action language as compared with more abstract language (see
also Willems et al. 2009: 2398).
5 This limitation becomes even more apparent in languages like Dutch or German where the inVnitive form
is in general distinct from tensed forms, whereas in English the inVnitive coincides with the present tense
form.
6 This does not mean that Hans didn’t have a particular destination in mind; for example, the university
which he was running to.
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is used in an idiomatic and not in its literal sense. (1d) does not necessarily describe
an event which involves a particular motor program involving the legs. For example, it
can be used in a situation where Hans did a great job in convincing the audience during
a talk he gave at the university.7
In order to explain these diUerences one has to take into consideration that events
occur in time, in contrast to ‘normal’ objects like tables and trees which persist in time.8
Furthermore, action and events have a particular temporal-causal or dynamic structure.
This structure can be described in terms of a nucleus structure in the sense of Moens
and Steedman (1988), which consists of a linearly ordered sequence of constituents or
parts: a development process (DP), a culmination (Cul) and a consequent state (CS) (in
Figure 1 a(e) and b(e) are the beginning and end point of the event e, respectively).
The important point is that the examples in (1) describe diUerent nuclei structures.
The nucleus structure for (1a) consists of a DP only because no destination, and there-
fore no CS (be at the destination) is speciVed. For (1b) the nucleus structure is the one
depicted in Figure 1. Here a destination is determined together with the CS Hans is at
the station. (1c) has two corresponding nuclei structures, i. e. those of (1a) and (1b).
These examples already make clear that a nucleus structure is underspeciVed in at least
two respects if only the verb, say laufen, is taken into consideration. First, the sort, or
type, of a possible goal is not (yet) determined. Second, the exact way in which the
running is executed is not (yet) determined. The two kinds of underspeciVcation are
not unrelated. Consider the examples in (2).
culmination 
development process consequent state 
.(e) (e) 
         
e 
Figure 1: Nucleus structure for bounded processes bringing about a result
(2) a. Bill grasped the needle.
b. Bill grasped the barbell.
The way the grasping is executed depends on the object that is grasped. As noted by
Willems et al. (2009: 2307), very diUerent action plans are necessary to successfully ex-
7 Though this example can also be used to describe a perfect 100 m performance by Hans in athletics.
8 Thus, for each time slice of a ‘normal’ object one always gets the complete object. By contrast, for actions
and events one usually only gets a proper part.
114
Dynamics in the Brain and Dynamic Frame
ecute the two actions described by the sentences in (2). Similarly, throwing a Frisbee or
a baseball requires diUerent grips and diUerent arm motions. These examples show that
the sortal information provided by the direct object is, at least in general, important to
resolve the underspeciVcation with respect to the exact motor program to be executed.
To make the fact of diUerent nuclei structures determined by the same verb clearer, let
us consider another set of examples involving the verb kick.
(3) a. John kicked Bill.
b. John kicked Bill several times.
c. John kicked the ball into the goal.
d. John kicked the bucket.
Example (3a) can be used to describe a single (atomic) kicking, the corresponding
nucleus structure of which consists of a Cul (without a CS, see Moens and Steedman
1988 and Naumann 2001 for details): NSCul. A sequence of such atomic kickings is
described by (3b): NSCul∗. The nucleus structure is complex because it consists of a
sequence of nuclei structures having a Cul only. Sentence (3c) describes an event in
which the kicking of the ball causes the latter’s location to change: before the kicking it
was not in the goal whereas it is in the goal as an eUect of the kicking. In this case, two
nuclei structures are related by a causal relation. The Vrst nucleus structure consists
of a Cul describing the kicking proper and the second is a nucleus structure consisting
of a DP, a Cul and a CS describing the movement of the ball into the goal: NS1 CAUSE
NS2. For (3d), the situation is diUerent. In this sentence, kick is not used in its literal
sense but it is used idiomatically. Since kick the bucket means die, the nucleus structure
consists of a Cul together with a CS (be dead).
Reconsidering the examples in (3), one gets: after processing John kicked, which
is common to all four sentences, a comprehender cannot (yet) know which of the
four nuclei structures is described by the sentence. However, using linguistic knowl-
edge/experience (e. g. frequency information) as well as world knowledge (what type
of nucleus structure occurs most often in the context of a kicking), (s)he has a particular
expectation about which nucleus structure is most likely be described. For example, the
literal (non-idiomatic) uses are in general more expected than the idiomatic sense in
(3d).9 For the literal uses, a possible ordering can be NSCul < NS1 CAUSE NS2 < NSCul∗,
i. e. single kickings are most expected, followed by kickings that are used to obtain a
9 However, in a context in which it is clear that John is going to die, (3d) can be the most expected contin-
uation.
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particular eUect and sequences of atomic kickings are least expected.10 In a particular
context, this default ordering has to be changed. For example, upon listening to . . . the
ball into the goal after processing John kicked . . . a comprehender comes to know that
the kicking had a destination and that therefore this sentence isn’t used to describe an
action of the most expected nucleus structure (Cul) but of type NS1 CAUSE NS2. As a
consequence, a less expected nucleus structure has to be chosen.
3 Interpreting action verbs in the brain
In our account, understanding the meaning of an action verb is in part determined by
knowledge of (i) the set of possible nuclei structures which describe possible temporal-
causal evolutions of actions and events denoted by the verb and (ii) the default ranking
among the elements of this set. This information about the meaning of a verb is stored
in MTG.
This knowledge is only necessary for grasping the (complete) meaning of such a
verb because verbs with identical sets of nuclei structures and default ranking would
have the same meaning.11 However, they diUer with respect to implicit simulations
in premotor cortex in the sense of Willems et al. (2009). Implicit simulations are
pre-enactments of potential future experiences, the principal function of which is the
ability to make predictions about how exactly an event will evolve and what its possible
consequences are. For example, a word like grasp can serve as a cue to activate neural
circuits involved in partial preparation of an action of grasping something. As noted
by the authors: “This schematic, unconscious, prospective activation of eUector-speciVc
regions in premotor cortex presumably facilitates further action planning if subsequent
cues call for grasping to be executed or to be imagined explicitly” (Willems et al. 2009:
2388).12
Linguistically, the ranked set of nuclei structures corresponds to the level of verbs
in the lexicon. Conceptually, it can be taken as a symbolic, amodal representation of the
10 Again, it must be stressed that this ordering is to be determined empirically and that it is in general – at
least in part – context dependent. For example, in case of a penalty kick during a football match, NS1
CAUSE NS2 is likely to be most expected.
11 But see below for a reVnement of this thesis.
12 By contrast, explicit imagery is covert enactment of an action. Like overt motor execution, motor imagery
may entail the generation of an action plan (inverse model) as well as a prediction of the action’s sensory
consequences (Willems et al. 2009: 2388). Its principle function is either reWective (i. e. covert reenactment
of prior actions) or prospective (e. g. an athlete usually imagines the concrete motor program before starting
his performance).
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concept expressed by the verb that is independent of sensory and motor simulations. By
contrast, implicit simulations correspond to projections of the verb like VP or sentences.
To be precise, implicit simulations are triggered when a comprehender has enough
information to determine a speciVc way or manner in which the action is executed.
As shown in the previous section, this is in general the case if (s)he knows which
object undergoes the change brought about by the action. Thus, implicit simulation
corresponds to the choice of an appropriate activity, modulo the direct object of the
verb.
When taken together, the meaning of a verb consists of two dimensions: a symbolic,
amodal dimension and diUerent ways in which these representations can be grounded
to speciVc activities that are undertaken in a particular situation.
Dimension Level of
Abstraction
Reference Neural
Correlate
Function Linguistic Level
conceptual symbolic and
amodal
ranked set of
nuclei
structures
MTG determination of possible
evolutions in terms of a
temporal-causal structure
(isolated) verb in
the lexicon
implicit
simulation
grounded instantiated
nuclei
structures
regions in
premotor
cortex
prediction and planning
(preenactment of actions)
projections of the
verb (VP and S)
At the conceptual dimension actions and events are taken as types (or schemes),
whereas at the second dimension these types are instantiated in a particular situation
in space and time, yielding an action or event token. This diUerentiation has the ad-
vantage of computational economy since it leads to a reduction on the requirement on
storage. DiUerent nuclei structures can be instantiated (or grounded) to various situa-
tions belonging to diUerent action types. One has a small number of abstract, symbolic
and amodal temporal-causal structures (nuclei structures) that can be instantiated in
an indeVnite number of concrete situations in space and time. In particular, a nucleus
structure of a particular type, say the one depicted in Figure 1 consisting of a DP Cul
CS, can be used for (i) diUerent action verbs and (ii) diUerent instantiations of the same
type of action. An example for (i) are verbs like eat and run. Both eat an apple and run
to the station are of type DP Cul CS. They diUer with respect to (i) the place in the de-
fault ordering and (ii) the types of possible activities that can instantiate this structure.
Whereas this nucleus structure is the most expected one for eat, this does not hold for
run, which basically describes unbounded actions with no particular goal or destination.
For eat, appropriate activities include putting food into the mouth using the hands, a
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fork or a spoon or, in the case of an animal, the lips and the tongue. By contrast, for
running events appropriate activities are fast movements typically involving the legs.
If a verb is encountered, the set of possible nuclei structures in middle temporal
gyrus is activated. In the absence of further information, a comprehender assumes that
an event corresponding to the most expected nucleus structure (or the most expected
nuclei structures) is (are) described. Accessing verb meanings therefore involves ac-
cessing the corresponding nuclei structures. The more complex a nucleus structure, the
longer the time to access and/or activate this structure. Thus, there is a cost in pro-
cessing time that depends on the complexity of the nucleus structure. For example, the
most expected nucleus structure for an activity verb like run is of type DP. By contrast,
for a verb like give, which expresses a causal relation involving two diUerent nuclei
structures, the most expected nucleus structure is more complex.13
The activation of the ranked set of nuclei structures does involve no immediate ac-
tivation of premotor or primary motor areas since no particular implicit or explicit sim-
ulation can yet be determined because the choice depends on the argument denoting
the object undergoing the change as well on the actor executing the action.14 Rather,
premotor areas related to implicit stimulations are activated only after the nuclei struc-
tures are instantiated. As noted above, this is the case for projections of the verb, in
particular the VP and the sentence level.
3.1 Empirical evidence for our approach
From what has been said so far, the following predictions can be derived from our
approach:
• There is only weak activation of primary and premotor areas upon processing of
the verb. Activation of the motor system is possible only if the underspeciVcation
inherent in a nucleus structure has been removed. This is in general possible only
if the type of the object undergoing the change is known.
13 NS1 : DP (action undertaken by the actor); NS2 : Cul CS (the recipient gets the theme).
14 Though this does not exclude the possibility that a comprehender activates a particular simulation in-
tentionally or by convention. For example, a football player or a football fan might usually immediately
engage in triggering simulations of a player kicking a football upon hearing or reading the verb kick. But
such simulations are independent of understanding the meaning of the verb or the sentence in which it
occurs. Rather, the meaning of the verb primes particular sorts of motor programs that can be used in
executing the action or event type.
118
Dynamics in the Brain and Dynamic Frame
• Sentences with an idiomatic sense elicit stronger activation in MTG because a
less expected nucleus structure must be chosen. This reordering triggers a higher
processing load reWected by a stronger activation in MTG.
• Complex nuclei structures trigger stronger activation because e. g. diUerent types
of nuclei structures must be related to each other (e. g. in a causal relation). The
general rule is: the more complex a nucleus structure, the stronger the activation.
• Implicit simulation depends on the expertise of the comprehender. For example,
both experts (players and fans) and laymen understand sentences about hockey
matches. However, players and fans are better able to implicitly simulate actions
undertaken during a game. Thus, one expects the same activation in MTG but
diUerences with respect to premotor activity.
Evidence for the truth of the Vrst two predictions comes from an fMRI study by
Boulenger et al. (2008). They examined how literal versus idiomatic sentences with
action verbs referring either to the leg (kick) or the arm (grasp) are processed in the
brain.
(4) a. He kicked the ball.
b. He kicked the bucket.
(5) a. He grasped the needle.
b. He grasped the idea.
Brain activity was measured at the onset of the critical word in the sentence (He
grasped the IDEA) which disambiguated between a literal and an idiomatic reading
(early analysis window) and three seconds after its end (late analysis window). They
found that (i) a common network of cortical activity was triggered for both conditions
in both analysis windows, with the idioms eliciting overall more distributed activity;
(ii) primary and premotor cortices were activated both for idioms and non-idioms; (iii)
activation of (frontocentral) primary and premotor areas was relatively weak both at
action verb onset (and therefore upon processing the action verb) and at the onset
of the critical word. However, it was strong after the oUset of the critical word both
for literal and idiomatic readings; (iv) sentences with literal meanings failed to elicit
stronger activation than sentences with an idiomatic reading in any brain area; (v) in
the late analysis, window cortical activity was greater in MTG and the cerebellum.15
In the present context Vndings (iii) and (v) are the most important ones. Finding (iii)
shows that there is no instant spreading of activation to primary or premotor cortex
15 Furthermore, there was stronger activation of idioms in inferior frontal gyrus in both windows.
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during action verb processing. Rather, this activation is delayed until after the direct
object has been processed. This is in contrast to the results for processing isolated
action verbs. Finding (v) can be taken as providing evidence for our claim that in case a
verb is used in an idiomatic sense the default ordering on the set of nuclei structures
must be changed (i. e. there is a reordering of the elements of this set), resulting in a
higher processing load, reWected in the higher activity in MTG.16
Evidence for the third prediction comes from two studies by Shetreet et al. (2007)
and Van Dam and colleagues (2010), respectively. Shetreet and colleagues found that
MTG responds more strongly to sentences with verbs that have more arguments, even
when the sentences have the same overall length. For example, processing John gave
Mary the book (three arguments) triggers stronger activity in MTG than the sentence
John ran to the station (two arguments). In our approach, a verb like give is related to a
complex nucleus structure consisting of two substructures that are linked by a causal
relation. The Vrst nucleus structure describes the action undertaken by the giver (actor)
whereas the second nucleus structure describes the event of the recipient receiving (and
thereby coming to possess) the theme, i. e. the object given. Van Dam and colleagues
(2010) found that the processing of action verbs like wipe that denote events describing
a particular way of moving part of the body triggers stronger inferior parietal activity
than verbs like clean for which no such manner is determined. This Vnding can be
explained as follows. Levin and Rappaport-Hovav (to appear) distinguish between verbs
of manner and verbs of result. Manner verbs specify a particular way in which an
action is executed. For example, wipe and brush determine a particular way of cleaning
an object without imposing the constraint that the result be attained at the end of the
event. By contrast, result verbs specify a particular end state of the action. For example,
clean requires the object undergoing the change, say a table, to be clean as a result of
the cleaning activity undertaken by the actor. However, no speciVc type of activity (or
manner) by which this end state is achieved is determined by the verb. In our approach,
manner verbs like wipe have a most expected nucleus structure of type DP, i. e. they
are basically activity verbs that are usually used to describe unbounded events which
need not bring about a particular result (similar to a verb like run). By contrast, a result
verb like clean has a most expected nucleus structure of type DP Cul CS. However, for
clean only the culmination is explicitly determined (the object has to be clean) but no
particular activity.
16 For details on how such orderings can be changed, see Naumann (2011, 2013, 2014).
120
Dynamics in the Brain and Dynamic Frame
In our approach, this means that the interpretation of a result verb is already de-
termined by the ranked set of nuclei structures since the only constraint is the one
imposed on the end state (be clean), which is already speciVed at the lexical level and
which therefore is independent of the object undergoing the change. As a consequence,
being able to implicitly simulate how the action can be executed is not part of the mean-
ing of the verb. From this it does not follow that a comprehender does not engage in an
implicit simulation (and, additionally, in explicit imagery). But in this case, (s)he plans
or imagines an execution that can be described by another verb, say wipe as in wipe the
table clean.
Further evidence for our analysis comes from a study by McKoon and Macfarland
(2000). They showed that there are no diUerences in processing time between transitive
and intransitive uses of so-called externally caused event verbs like break and awake.
(6) a. The Vre alarm awoke the residents.
b. The residents awoke.
By contrast, for internally caused event verbs like bloom and wilt, processing times
are signiVcantly shorter than those for externally caused event verbs.
(7) a. The bright sun wilted the roses.
b. The roses wilted.
Again, there are no diUerences between the transitive and the intransitive form.
These results therefore show that the processing time depends on the type of the (pre-
ferred or most expected) nucleus structure. Furthermore, these examples show that the
cost in processing time is independent of the exact syntactic realization (transitive vs.
intransitive). Rather, it only depends on the corresponding types of nuclei structures.
Similar results were obtained by Gennari and Poeppel (2003). They showed that
processing non-stative verbs like vanish and solve takes longer than processing stative
verbs like love and exist (about 25 ms), even if the argument structures are identical (e. g.
exist and vanish).
Evidence for the fourth prediction comes from a study by Beilock and colleagues
(2008). They let hockey players, hockey fans and hockey novices listen to sentences
about hockey-related actions. They found that both for hockey players and hockey
fans there was an increased activity in dorsal premotor cortex compared to the activity
in this area for hockey novices. Furthermore, this stronger activity was inWuenced by
experience with hockey games but not necessarily by motor experience directly related
to playing the sport. For example, dorsal activity was the same for hockey players and
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hockey fans. In addition, only for hockey novices the primary sensory-motor cortices
were active and increased primary sensory-motor activity correlated negatively with
action sentence comprehension.
The above empirical results can be taken as evidence for the following two hypothe-
ses: (i) result verbs are not directly related to particular implicit simulations or motor
programs and (ii) for result verbs, grounding of a corresponding nucleus structure is, at
least in part, independent of their types. By contrast, manner verbs require (i) activation
of the related ranked set of nuclei structures in MTG and (ii) an implicit simulation in
premotor cortex (in order to distinguish say brush from wipe). These hypotheses raise
the following questions: (i) what is the exact relation between the ranked set of nuclei
structures and implicit simulations? And (ii) where is this relation stored in the brain
(i. e. what is the neuronal correlate of this relation)? One answer to the Vrst question
is that the ranked set of nuclei structures for a verb in MTG primes certain implicit
simulations in premotor cortex. To be more precise: both manner and result verbs are
related to a set of appropriate activities. Information about these activities is stored in
regions of premotor cortex. For manner verbs this set is more restricted than that for
result verbs. Furthermore, and more importantly, the set of activities for manner verbs
is ranked in the sense that not all elements in this set are equally expected. By contrast,
for result verbs there is no ranking on this set. For example, for wipe, one has rub with
a cloth or one’s hand and for brush, rub with a brush. The set of appropriate activities
for clean comprises those for wipe and brush (and those for other manner verbs which
denote actions for cleaning something). A possible answer to the second question goes
along Hebbian lines. Neuronal correlation is mapped onto connection strength. If an
action verb frequently co-occurs with body movements that are executions of an ac-
tion of the type denoted by the verb, this strengthens the connection between regions
in MTG and regions in premotor cortex. There remain, of course, a number of open
empirical questions, for example: Where in the brain is the ‘meaning assembly’ between
a verb and its arguments located, i. e. what is the exact relation between verbal (dynamic)
and non-verbal (static) meanings? and How is the ranked set of nuclei structures acquired
in the brain during language learning?
Furthermore, the above results also show that the various dimensions are not inde-
pendent of each other. When taken together, the Vndings of the empirical studies used
in this article suggest the following relation. Both implicit and explicit simulations are
functionally or causally dependent on the conceptual domain consisting of the ranked
set of nuclei structures in MTG. Empirical evidence supporting this claim is: (i) MTG
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responds to verbs in isolation for sentences with transitive verbs and (ii) the motor sys-
tem is activated only after the direct object has been processed. Thus, when processing
a verb, regions in MTG are activated but no eUector-speciVc activity in the motor sys-
tem is (yet) triggered. Consequently, MTG is activated prior to the motor system. By
itself, this temporal relation does not show that there is a functional or causal relation
between those dimensions. However, both types of activity are directly related to pro-
cessing the verb and therefore to understanding its meaning, which makes it likely that
some functional relation is involved. Of course, this claim needs to be conVrmed by
further empirical investigations.
Finally, an important empirical question is this: is the ability to trigger implicit sim-
ulations in premotor cortex constitutive of grasping the meaning of (or to have the
concept corresponding to) an action verb? In our approach the answer is negative for
the following reason. The two dimensions in the meaning of an action verb correspond
to diUerent functions language and cognition have. The conceptual dimension is related
to naming and recognizing objects of the given type. Evidence for this comes from stud-
ies of patients suUering from apraxia as well as from the discussion of the results about
hockey obtained by Beilock and colleagues. This dimension is non-goal oriented in the
sense that no implicit preenactment of a possible execution is involved.17 The second
dimension, i. e. implicit simulation, is related to reWecting, predicting and planning an
action of the given type by selecting appropriate activities and inferring future conse-
quences of executing this action. Possible questions are: How can the goal be reached?,
What is an appropriate activity to reach the goal or to execute the action? and What are
possible consequences of executing the action? This dimension therefore is goal-oriented
at a theoretical level (i. e. it does not involve the ability to execute a motor program).
This ability is a necessary condition for being able to attain a goal or result by executing
an action of the given type. For example, in the case of eating one can use the hands or,
alternatively, a fork and a knife. By contrast, explicit imagery corresponds to the ability
of actually executing a motor program to attain the goal.18 The inability to have implicit
simulations impairs a speaker for this particular function. This is the case for patients
17 Though it may involve naming the goal of a possible execution, e. g. making an object clean for the verb
clean since involving a goal (Cul) is part of the most expected nucleus structure of this verb.
18 Additional evidence for this analysis comes from studies of apraxia, i. e. the inability to perform particular
activities as a result of brain damage. People suUering from this inability are impaired for using objects of a
particular kind, say a hammer, though they are unimpaired for (i) naming those objects and (ii) recognizing
pantomimes associated with uses of those objects. Thus, integrity of motor processes is not necessary in
order for object naming and action recognition to be in the normal range; see Mahon and Caramazza (2008)
for details.
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suUering from apraxia. However, the Beilock et al. study shows that that the ability
to have implicit simulations comes in degrees. Hockey novices do have activity in the
motor system, though it is less strong than the activity triggered in hockey players and
hockey fans.19
3.2 Comparison to theories of grounded cognition
Our approach diUers from theories of grounded cognition in the following respects.
First, ‘automatic activation’ does not mean that the motor system is immediately ac-
tivated when a verb is processed in the brain, i. e. that linguistically processed input
immediately results in activation of the motor and sensory systems. Rather, what is
immediately activated is the ranked set of nuclei structures. Groundedness is not an
attribute of the verb proper but rather a property of its projections like VP or S. The
reason for this is that the conceptual level stored in MTG is impoverished in the sense
that verbs which have the same ranked set of nuclei structures cannot be distinguished.
This distinction is only made if a nucleues structure is instantiated. The neural correlate
of this instantiation is an implicit simulation in premotor cortex.
It may seem that this view is contradicted by the results of Hauk et al. (2004) and
others showing that the motor system is activated rather quickly. Recall that Hauk
et al. found that when presented with the word kick the ‘leg’ region of the motor
system is activated within a time span of about 200 ms. Yet those results do not provide
counterevidence to our claims. First, those results were obtained for isolated verbs and
not for sentences in which these verbs occur as a constituent and this fact was known
to the participants. When taken in isolation, a verb like kick is interpreted by uniquely
describing a nucleus structure consisting only of a Cul because a comprehender already
knows that no further information, say about a goal of the kicking, is added, which may
make it necessary to change the nucleus structure to one of type Cul CAUSE NS2.
A second diUerence is that in our approach, following Willems et al. (2009), a distinc-
tion is made between implicit simulations and explicit imagery. Third, explicit imagery
is an epiphenomenon of processing (and thereby understanding the meaning) of the
verb. As pointed out in the previous section, a verb (or its corresponding ranked set
of nuclei structures) primes certain ways in which an action denoted by the verb is exe-
cuted. As a result, an implicit simulation can be triggered. This way of undertaking the
19 However, it remains an open empirical question of whether this activity is related to both implicit simu-
lation and explicit imagery or to only one of those activities in the motor system.
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action may subsequently result in explicit imagery of the corresponding action. Fourth,
and most importantly, a distinction between a symbolic and amodal dimension and a
grounded dimension is made in the deVnition of the meaning of an action verb.
Summarizing, one can say that theories of grounded cognition only capture one par-
ticular dimension of a verb’s meaning, i. e. that related to the motor system. However,
they usually do not distinguish between implicit simulations and explicit imagery. In
addition, if it is true that both of these activities in the motor system are functionally
and causally dependent on a conceptual dimension, they fail to give a satisfactory ac-
count of how meanings are represented and accessed in the human brain. This failure is
in large part due to the fact that most often only isolated verbs and not larger linguistic
contexts, like sentences, in which those verbs occur are considered.
Another way of comparing theories of grounded cognition and ours is the following.
Mahon and Caramazza (2008) distinguish four possibilities of how the motor system
can be related to a conceptual dimension.
1. Processing the verb directly activates the motor system, with no intervening ac-
cess to abstract conceptual content.
2. Processing the verb directly activates the motor system and in parallel activates
abstract conceptual content.
3. Processing the verb directly activates the motor system and then subsequently
activates an abstract conceptual representation.
4. Processing the verb directly activates an abstract conceptual representation and
then activates the motor system.
Only on the fourth possibility is the conceptual dimension activated before the motor
system, whereas in the other three possibilities the motor system is either independent
of the conceptual dimension (1), works in parallel with it (2) or there is a cascading Wow
of information from the motor system to the conceptual dimension (3). The Vrst three
possibilities underlie the various forms of theories of grounded cognition: The motor
system is never activated after the conceptual system (provided the latter is assumed
at all). Our approach is characterized by the fourth possibility. First, the ranked set of
nuclei structures in MTG is activated and subsequently implicit simulations in speciVc
premotor areas are triggered by a spreading activation.
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4 Comparison to other approaches
Similar to our approach, the grounding by interaction account proposed in Mahon and
Caramazza (2008) distinguishes between an abstract or symbolic level of representa-
tion and its instantiation (or grounding) in a particular situation. The symbolic level
is conceptual and characterized by various output modalities like being able to name an
object or action falling under the given concept or knowing something about the way it
is built up or construed. For example, in the case of a hammer this conceptual knowl-
edge possibly involves being able to recount the history of the hammer as an invention,
the materials of which the Vrst hammer was made, or what hammers typically weigh
(Mahon and Caramazza 2008: 67 f.). This conceptual information can apply to diverse
sensory modalities like touch, vision or audition. What is missing from this level is the
interaction with the world. Conceptual information is not isolated. Rather, it can be
activated by events in the world that are processed by the sensory system. As an eUect,
the conceptual information gets instantiated in a particular situation. The speciVc sen-
sory and motor information that is activated may change depending on the situation in
which the abstract conceptual information is instantiated (Mahon and Caramazza 2008:
68). However, from this it does not follow that the sensory and motor information is
constitutive of the concept. Rather, removing the sensory and motor system would re-
sult in impoverished and isolated concepts. Thus, the activation of sensory and motor
processes contributes to the ‘full’ representation of the concept.
The approach presented here bears some similarity with constraint-satisfaction-
based approaches, like that of Jurafsky (1996) for example. According to such accounts,
the processing of a sentence Vrst involves the activation of several possible interpreta-
tions. These interpretations are ranked according to a probability measure that is based,
among other factors, on the likelihood of a particular word being used in a particular
context or the likelihood of a verb to be used with a particular meaning. For exam-
ple, the noun nail refers either to a body part (Vngernail, toenail) or a metal fastener.
Processing this word therefore involves activation of brain areas related to both mean-
ings of the word.20 This set of possible interpretations is narrowed down when further
information in the sentence is processed: The nail he used to put up the picture.
20 According to Zwaan and Kaschak (2008), from which this example is taken, the processing involves the
activation of traces or mental simulations that are relevant to both senses of the word, in accordance with
the embodiment thesis.
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5 Conclusion
In this article we presented a theory of action verbs that combines an abstract, modality-
independent component with a modality-speciVc component located in regions of pre-
motor cortex. Semantically, this analysis is based on the observation that a verb like
kick can be used to express diUerent types of actions (kick/kick the ball/kick the ball
into the goal) that diUer with respect to parameters like telic/atelic, result/no_result or
atomic/iteration. The conceptual information about events are the diUerent types of
nuclei structures and the meaning-relevant information about a verb is the ranked set
of such structures that represents the conceptual dimension of its meaning. This infor-
mation is amodal and concerns the temporal-causal structure of an action or event. It is
stored in MTG, which has been shown to respond to the processing of verbs as opposed
to nouns and adjectives.
This temporal-causal structure is underspeciVed with respect to the exact way or
manner (motor program) an action of a particular type is executed because this way
depends on the object undergoing the change. After combining with the direct object of
the verb, this structure is grounded or instantiated by a spreading activation to premotor
cortex leading to an implicit simulation which makes it possible to derive additional
conclusions about this structure.
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